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Harrington: Domestic Relations
DOMESTIC RELATIONS
I. CEID SUPPORT

A. Termination of Obligation to Foster Child
In Chestnut v. Chestnut' the plaintiff sought to compel her
husband to contribute to the support of a child which had been
left in the custody of the plaintiff and the defendant shortly
after its birth. The child was never adopted by the couple but
it was given the family name of Chestnut and was voluntarily
supported by the defendant as a member of the family. The
question of support arose after the parties separated, and the
husband refused to continue to support the child. The trial
court held that the defendant had assumed an obligation to
support the child by providing a home for it as a member of the
family and the obligation could not be divested by the separation of the plaintiff and defendant. The supreme court, finding
no South Carolina authorities in point, reversed, assuming for
purposes of the decision, that the defendant, while living with
his family, had placed himself in loco parentis to the child and
adopting the majority view that, in the absence of an agreement
or other circumstance indicating that the obligation was permanent, the status of one standing in loco parentis is of a tem2
porary nature and terminable at will.
B. Support of Illegitimate Child
The defendant in State v. Montgomery3 was convicted in the
lower court for the nonsupport of an illegitimate child, a misdemeanor.4 The indictment merely charged that the defendant
was an able-bodied man and capable of earning and making a
livelihood and that he did without just cause or excuse "fail to
supply the actual necessaries of life to his minor, unmarried
child who was and is dependent on him ....

' In reversing the

1. 247 S.C. 332, 147 S.E.2d 269 (1966).
2. E.g., State ex rel. Gilman v. Bacon, 249 Iowa 1233, 91 N.W2d 395
(1958); McDonald v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 267 S.W. 1074 (Tex.

Civ. App. 1925). See generally, 67 C.J.S. Parent and Child § 80 (1950).
3. 246 S.C. 545, 144 S.E.2d 797 (1965).
4. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 20-303 (Supp. 1965). This section provides in part:

Any able-bodied man or man capable of earning or making a livelihood who shall, without just cause or excuse, abandon or fail to supply
the actual necessaries of life to his wife or to his minor unmarried
legitimate or illegitimate child or children dependent upon him shall
be guilty of a misdemeanor....
5. State v. Montgomery, 246 S.C. 545, 547, 144 S.E.2d 797, 798 (1965).
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conviction the court applied the well settled rule that "an indictment should allege the offense with sufficient certainty and
particularity to enable the court to know what judgment to
pronounce, the defendant to know what he is called upon to
answer, and an acquittal may be pleaded in bar to any subsequent prosecution."6 The indictment in this case was fatally
deficient in failing to designate the child as illegitimate and
failing to indicate the date of birth or other description of the
child so that it could be identified. 7
II.

DIvoRcE

A. Condontion
Buero v. Buero8 was an action brought by the wife for divorce on the ground of physical cruelty. The record disclosed
that the wife continued to live in the same home with the husband after each incident and throughout the divorce proceedings, that she prepared the meals, washed the clothes, took hot
meals to the husband at work, went grocery shopping with him
and that the husband continued to pay all living expenses. The
husband interposed the defense of condonation. The findings of
a special master, adopted as the judgment of the circuit court,
were that the husband had been guilty of physical cruelty and,
although the couple continued to occupy the same house, they
were not living as man and wife so there was no condonation.
The only testimony to support the claim that there were no
marital relations came from the wife. On appeal the court
reversed since it is generally presumed that sexual intercourse
has taken place between a married couple where the evidence
shows they occupied the same living quarters9 and the presumption is not overcome by the unsupported testimony of one of
6. Ibid; accord, State v. McIntire, 221 S.C. 504, 71 S.E.2d 410 (1952).
See 42 C.J.S. Indictment and Information § 100 (1944).
7. It should be noted that there was testimony that this was the sixth
illegitimate child of the prosecutrix by the defendant and that the defendant
was married to another woman and the father of six legitimate children.
Furthermore, the court said it was inferable from the record that the prosecutrix had illegitimate children other than those by defendant and that the
defendant had illegitimate children by other women.
8. 246 S.C. 355, 143 S.E2d 719 (1965).
9. Boozer v. Boozer, 242 S.C. 292, 130 S.E.2d 903 (1963); see 27A
CJ.S. Divorce § 123 (10) (1959).
10. Boozer v. Boozer, 242 S.C. 292, 130 S.E.2d 903 (1963).
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the parties.' 0 The voluntary cohabitation by the wife after the
acts of physical cruelty conclusively showed condonation."B. Jurisdiction
In Gasque v. Gasque'2 the court, in accord with the weight of
authority, construed the word "resided" as used in the residence
requirement section' 3 of the South Carolina divorce statute to
be equivalent in substance with the term "domociled."' 4 The
husband brought an action for divorce which was dismissed in
the lower court on the ground that he had not resided in South
Carolina for at least one year prior to the commencement of
the action. The husband was a native of South Carolina but
had been employed by the United States Government, first as
General Counsel of the United States Senate and subsequently
as Assistant Director of the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts, in Washington, D. C., for approximately fourteen years. He had lived with his family in the District of
Columbia during most of this time. The court reversed, quoting
the definition of "domicile" from Phillips v. South Carolina
Tam Comm'n'0 which was "the place where a person has his
true, fixed and permanent home and principal establishment,
to which he has, whenever he is absent, an intention of returning."1' There was testimony and substantial documentary evidence to show that the husband considered himself a resident of
the state and never intended to become a resident of any other
state. Moreover, the cases generally hold that a person who
holds public office or employment may retain his domicile in
the state from which he comes until the service terminates even
though he may be absent for several years. 17
11. McLaughlin v. McLaughlin, 244 S.C. 265, 136 S.E.2d 537 (1964); see 1
NELSON, DIVORCE AND ANNULMENT, § 11.02 (2d ed. 1945).

12. 246 S.C. 423, 143 S.E.2d 811 (1965).
13. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-103 (1962). The section reads:
In order to institute an action for divorce from the bonds of matrimony the plaintiff must have resided in this State at least one year prior
to the commencement of the action or, if the plaintiff is a nonresident,
the defendant must have so resided in this State for such period.
14. E.g., Tate v. Tate, 149 W.Va. 591, 142 S.E.2d 751 (1965); Gromel v.
Gromel, 197 N.Y.S.2d 941 (Sup. Ct. 1959); see 2A NELsoN, DIVORCE AND
ANNULMENT, § 21.13 (2d ed. 1961). See also Phillips v. South Carolina Tax
Comm'n, 195 S.C. 472, 12 S.E.2d 13 (1940).
15. 195 S.C. 472, 12 S.E.2d 13 (1940).
16. Id. at 477, 12 S.E.2d at 16.
17. E.g., Richardson v. Richardson, 258 Ala. 423, 63 So. 2d 364 (1953);
Wilburn v. Wilburn, 260 N.C. 208, 132 S.E.2d 332 (1963). See 1939-40 Ops.
A'r'Y GEN. S.C. 238; 24 Am. JuR. 2d Divorce and Separation § 255 (1966).
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8 the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
In Porter v. Porter1
Court of Greenville County entered a decree granting the wife
a divorce, awarding to her custody of the couple's minor daughter with visitation rights afforded the husband, alimony, support of the minor child and attorneys' fees. On appeal to the
Common Pleas Court of Greenville County, the visitation rights
of the husband were increased and the alimony and award for
support of the daughter were reduced although the circuit judge
found no facts at variance with those found by the trial court.
The supreme court held, in line with the general rule, that the
matters of visitation rights,1 9 alimony 20 and child support 2 ' are
all addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court and will
not be disturbed unless an abuse thereof is shown. And since
"this case was carried by appeal from the decree of the Juvenile
and Domestic Relations Court of Greenville County to the circuit court, the latter could only exercise appellate jurisdiction
therein. 2 2 The circuit judge, sitting in appellate capacity,
therefore, erred in increasing the visitation rights of the husband and in reducing the alimony and award of child support
when he did not find that the trial judge had abused his discretion.

C. Motion for Dismissal by Party Bringing the Action Before
Issue Joined
In Knopf v. Knopf 23 the husband commenced an action for
divorce against the wife in the Richland County Court. Twenty
days after the commencement of the action and before service
of any responsive pleadings by the wife, the husband served a
motion for an order of dismissal. Pending hearing of the motion, the wife filed an answer in which she denied the allegations of the complaint, and, "by way of affirmative relief,"
18. 246 S.C. 332, 143 S.E.2d 619 (1965).

19. See, e.g., Griffin v. Griffin, 237 N.C. 404, 75 S.E.2d 133 (1953); Joslin

v. Joslin, 45 Wash. 2d 357, 274 P2d 847 (1954).
Divorce § 312 (1959).

See generally 27B CJ.S.

20. Murdock v. Murdock, 243 S.C. 218, 133 S.E2d 323 (1963).

erally 27B CJ.S. Divorce § 288(3) (1959).

See gen-

21. See, e.g., Reese v. Reese, 26 Ill. App. 2d 244, 167 N.E.2d 812 (1960);

Kamphaus v. Kamphaus, 174 Kan. 494, 256 P.2d 883 (1953).
27B C.J.S. Divorce § 324(14) (1959).

See generally

22. Porter v. Porter, 246 S.C. 332, 338, 143 S.E2d 619, 623 (1965); see

S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-1281.9 (1962) and § 15-1281.32 (Supp. 1965) together
with S.C. CoNsr. art. 5, § 15.
23. 247 S.C. 378, 147 S.E2d 638 (1966).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol19/iss1/9

4

Harrington: Domestic Relations
Sou-'H OAROLINA LAW REviEw

[
[Vol.
19

sought custody of the parties' two children. The county judge
heard and refused the motion to dismiss the action and the
husband appealed. The court reversed, holding that the refusal
to grant the husband's motion to dismiss was an abuse of discretion where there was no evidence that to allow the motion
would result in legal prejudice to the wife.24 Under section
20-11525r of the South Carolina Code, "an action of divorce
brings with it the issue of child custody, and the divorce court
has continuing jurisdiction of such as incident and subsidiary to
the principle issue of divorce." 26 The wife's "affirmative" plea
which contained no allegation of fact sufficient to invoke the
jurisdiction of the court on the issue of child custody had vitality only as ancillary to the divorce action, in which the wife
denied the critical allegations of the divorce action and sought
its dismissal. The wife could not "insist on the maintenance of
the action as a means of preserving the county court's jurisdiction of the custody issue, which, under the facts, it may properly
27
exercise only as a divorce court."
JoHN

M. H[ARRNGTON

24. See Gulledge v. Young, 242 S.C. 287, 130 S.E.2d 695 (1963).
25. S.C. CoDE Aim. § 20-115 (1962).
26. Knopf v. Kuopf, 247 S.C. 378, 382, 147 S.E2d 638, 639 (1966); see
Jackson v. Jackson, 241 S.C. 1, 13, 126 S.E2d 855, 862 (1962).
27. Knopf v. Knopf, supra note 26 at 382, 147 S.E.2d at 640.
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